The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented.
Introduction
The discipline of game theory studies decision making in an interactive environment. One particularly complex and fruitful branch of game theory is dynamic or differential games, which investigates interactive decision making over time. The origin of differential games traces back to [1] which for various reasons did not appear in print until 1965. Research in differential games focused in the first place on extending control theory to incorporate strategic behavior. Berkovitz [2] developed a variational approach to differential games, and Leitmann and Mon [3] investigated the geometry of differential games. Pontryagin [4] solved differential games in open-loop solution in terms of the maximum principle. Krasovsky and Subbotin [5] provided a general mathematical theory for solving zero-sum differential games. Fleming [6] provided the solution mechanism to stochastic control problems. Stochastic differential games, which are fundamentally based on Fleming's result, tackle interactive decision problems involving stochastic dynamics. Recently, Yeung [7, 8] introduced the paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games which incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games.
Cooperative games suggest the possibility of socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic action. In dynamic cooperative games, a stringent condition for a dynamically stable solution is required: In the solution, the optimality principle must remain optimal throughout the game, at any instant of time along the optimal state trajectory determined at the outset. This condition is known as dynamic stability or time consistency. The question of dynamic stability in differential games has been rigorously explored in the past three decades (see [9] [10] [11] ). In the presence of stochastic elements, a more stringent condition -that of subgame consistency -is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame-consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal. In particular the property of subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds players are guided by the same optimality principle at each instant of time, and hence do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior throughout the game.
A rigorous framework for the study of subgame-consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games was established in the work of Yeung and Petrosyan [12, 13] . A generalized theorem was developed for the derivation of an analytically tractable "payoff distribution procedure" which would lead to subgame-consistent solutions in [14] . Yeung and Petrosyan [15] presented a stochastic differential game of dynamically stable joint ventures.
This paper considers subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic game formulation and noncooperative game outcomes. Section 3 discusses the issues in dynamic cooperation including group optimality and individual rationality. Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions and the corresponding equilibrating transitory compensations leading to such solutions are derived. An illustration in resource extraction is provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Game formulation and noncooperative outcomes
Consider a class of randomly furcating stochastic differential game in which there are two players. The game interval is [t 0 , T ]. When the game commences at t 0 , the payoff structures of the players are known. In future instants of time t k (k = 1, 2, . . . , m), where t 0 < t m < T ≡ t m+1 , the payoff structures are affected by a series of random events Θ k . In particular, Θ k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, are independent and identically distributed random variables with range {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η } and corresponding probabilities {λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ η }. Changes in preference, technology, legal arrangements and the physical environments are examples of factors which constitute the change in payoff structures. At time T a terminal value q i (x(T )) will be given to player i. Specifically player i seeks to maximize:
where x(s) ∈ X ⊂ R n is a vector of state variables, θ h α k ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η } for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, θ α 0 = θ 0 0 ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η } is known at time t 0 , r is the discount rate, u i ∈ U i is the control of player i, and E t 0 denotes the expectation operator performed at time t 0 . The payoffs of the players are transferable.
The state dynamics of the game is characterized by the vector-valued stochastic differential equations: ∈ θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η has occurred at time instant t m and x (t m ) = x t m ∈ X , player i maximizes the payoff:
The conditions characterizing a Nash equilibrium solution of the game (2.3) and (2.4) can be obtained as: 
, which satisfy the following partial differential equations:
Proof. This result follows readily from the optimality principles in [1, 6] and [16] .
For ease of exposition and sidestepping the issue of multiple equilibria, we assume that a particular noncooperative Nash equilibrium is adopted in the entire subgame. In order to formulate the subgame in the second to last time interval [t m−1 , t m ), it is necessary to identify the expected terminal payoffs at time t m . If θ m ∈ θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η , the expected payoff to player i for playing the subgame in the last interval payoff can be obtained as:
The expected terminal payoff of player i, for i ∈ {1, 2}, in the subgame over the time interval t m−1 , t m can be computed as (2.6) under the assumption that a particular Nash equilibrium is adopted in each of the possible subgame scenarios in the time interval
. . , θ η occurs at time t m−1 the subgame in the time interval t m−1 , t m , it can be formally set up as:
. . , θ η occurs at time t k the subgame in the time interval [t k , t k+1 ), for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 2} can be set up as:
Following Lemma 2.1 a Nash equilibrium solution of game (2.1) and (2.2) can be characterized by the following theorem:
. . , θ η constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution for the game (2.1) and (2.2), if there exist continuously differentiable functions
Two remarks that will be utilized in subsequent analysis is given below.
Remark 2.3. One can readily verify that
is the expected payoff function to player i in the game
Remark 2.4. One can also readily verify that
is the value function to player i in the game
Dynamic cooperation
Now consider the case when the players want to cooperate and agree to act and allocate the cooperative payoff according to a set of agreed upon optimality principles. The agreement on how to act cooperatively and allocate cooperative payoff constitutes the solution optimality principle of a cooperative scheme. In particular, the solution optimality principle for the cooperative game (2.1) and (2.2) includes (i) an agreement on a set of cooperative strategies/controls, and (ii) a mechanism to distribute total payoff between players.
Both group rationality and individual rationality are required in a cooperative plan. Group rationality requires the players to seek a set of cooperative strategies/controls that yields a Pareto optimal solution. The allocation principle has to satisfy individual rationality in the sense that neither player would be worse off than before under cooperation.
Group rationality
Since payoffs are transferable, group rationality requires the players to maximize their expected joint payoff
subject to (2.2). We solve the control problem (3.1) and (2.1) in a manner similar to that we used to solve the game (2.1) and (2.2). Invoking Fleming's technique of stochastic control, we obtain the conditions characterizing an optimal solution of the problem (2.2) and (3.1) as: 
→ R, for i ∈ {1, 2}, which satisfy the following partial differential equaions:
Proof. Following the argument in the analysis in Section 2 we obtain η α=1 λ α W [θ m α ](k+1) t k+1 , x t k+1 as the expected terminal value for the stochastic control problem in the time interval [t k , t k+1 ], for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m}. Then direct application of Fleming's stochastic control technique [6] yields Theorem 3.5.
Hence under cooperation the players will adopt the cooperative strategy ψ
. . , θ η occurs at time t h , for h ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m}. In a cooperative framework, the issue of non-uniqueness of the optimal controls can be resolved by agreement between the players on a particular set of controls. Substituting the set of cooperative strategies into (2.2) yields the dynamics of the cooperative state trajectory in the time interval [t k , t k+1 ) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m} as
2)
. . , θ η occurs at time t k . For simplicity in exposition we denote the set of state variable realizable at time t according to (3.2) by X * t , and use x * t to denote an element in X * t that would occur. Finally, similar to Remarks 2.3 and 2.4 we have two results that will be utilized in subsequent analysis: Remark 3.6. One can readily verify that
is the maximized value of the stochastic control problem
Remark 3.7. One can readily verify that
Individual rationality
Assume that at time t 0 when the initial state is x 0 the agreed upon optimality principle assigns a set of imputation vectors contingent upon the events θ 0 0 and θ h α h for θ α h ∈ θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η and h ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m}. We use
to denote an imputation vector of the gains in such a way that the share of the ith player over the time interval [t 0 , T ] is equal to ξ
In a dynamic framework, individual rationality has to be maintained at every instant of time t ∈ [t 0 , T ] along the cooperative trajectory. At time t, for t ∈ [t 0 , t 1 ), if the players are allowed to reconsider their cooperative plan, they will compare their cooperative payoff to their noncooperative payoff at that time. Using the same optimality principle, at time t, for t ∈ [t 0 , t 1 ), an imputation vector will assign the shares of the players over the time interval [t, T ] as ξ
(in current value at time t). Individual rationality requires that
t , for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ [t 0 , t 1 ).
At time t h , for h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ }, if θ h α h ∈ θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ η has occurred and the state is x * t h , the same optimality principle assigns an imputation vector
(in current value at time t h ). Individual rationality is satisfied if:
, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Using the same optimality principle, at time t, for t ∈ [t k , t k+1 ), an imputation vector will assign the shares of the players over the time interval [t, T ] as
(in terms of current value at time t). Individual rationality requires that ξ
(h)t t, x * t , for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ [t h , t h+1 ) and h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}.
Subgame consistent solutions and payoff distribution
A stringent requirement for solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games to be dynamically stable is the property of subgame consistency. Under subgame consistency, an extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behaviors would remain optimal. In particular, when the game proceeds, at each instant of time the players are guided by the same optimality principles, and hence do not have any ground for deviation from the previously adopted optimal behavior throughout the game. A dynamically stable solution to the randomly furcating game (2.1) and (2.2) is sought in this section.
Solution imputation vector
According to the solution optimality principle the players agree to share their cooperative payoff according to the following set of imputation vectors
. . , θ η and h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m},
. . , θ η and h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. (k)τ t, x * t may be governed by many specific principles. For instance, the players agree to maximize the sum of their payoffs and equally divide the excess of the cooperative payoff over the noncooperative payoff. This yields the Shapley value imputation. The imputation scheme has to satisfy:
, and
for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ (t k , t k+1 ).
As another example, the solution imputation ξ i θ k α k (k)τ t, x * t may be an allocation principle in which the players allocate the total joint payoff according to the relative sizes of the firms' noncooperative profits. Hence the imputation scheme has to satisfy Scheme 4.9.
Crucial to the analysis is the formulation of a payoff distribution mechanism that would lead to the realization of Condition (4.1). This will be done in the next subsection. 
Subgame-consistent payoff distribution procedure
According to (4.1) the players agree to share their cooperative payoff according to the imputation ξ 
As the game proceed to at time t, for t ∈ [t m , T ), using the same optimality principle an imputation vector will assign the shares of the players over the time interval [t, T ] as ξ i θ m αm (m)t t, x * t . For consistency reasons, it is required that If the conditions from (4.4) to (4.6) are satisfied, one can say that the solution imputations are time-consistent in the sense that (4.1) can be realized. Now we define
Using (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7), we have
Moreover, we can write
where
From (4.9) we obtain
Invoking (4.8) yields
being functions that are continuously twice differentiable in t and x * t , one can express (4.11), with t → 0, as: where u 1 (s) is the harvest rate of extractor 1 and u 2 (s) is the harvest rate of extractor 2. The dynamics is adopted from [17] .
The instantaneous payoff at time s ∈ [t 0 , T ] for player 1 and player 2 are respectively: 2 , c 1 and c 2 are constants. At time t 0 , it is known that θ 1 has occurred. θ 1 will remain in effect until time t 1 ∈ (t 0 , T ). At time t 1 , the corresponding probabilities for the events {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 } to occur are {λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 } = {1/4, 1/2, 1/4}. The occurred event will remain until the end of the game, that is time T . At time T , each extractor will receive a termination bonus q x (T ) 1/2 , which depends on the resource remaining at the terminal time. Payoffs are transferable between player 1 and player 2 and over time. There is a constant discount rate r .
Applying Theorem 2.2, we obtain the following value functions for the associated noncooperative games. 
